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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROY F. TYGESEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MAGNA WATER COMPANY, 
an Improvement District, and 
P. W. SEAY, B. L. CASEY 
and HOWARD RIDGE, its 
Board of Trustees, 
Defendants. 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General of the 
State of Utah, 
Third Party Defendant. 
DEFENDANTS' 
BRIEF 
Case No. 7550 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant agrees with the statement of facts 
as they are ably presented in the Brief of the Plain-
tiff. 
PURPOSE OF THE ACT 
CHAPTER 24, LAWS OF UTAH 1949 
To deal adequately with the problem of the con-
stitutionality of a statute it appears to the writer 
that the purpose of the act must be carefully con-
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suited. The act provides for the creation of Im-
provements Districts. The Act itself sets forth its 
purpose in its first section as follows: 
" .... any district so created shall have 
authority through construction, purchase, gift 
or condemnation, or any combination thereof, 
to acquire and operate all or any part of the 
following or any combination thereof: 
" ( 1) Systems for the supply, treatment 
and distribution of water; and 
" ( 2) Systems for the collection, treat-
ment and disposition of sewage." 
Behind that terse statement of powers and 
purposes is a significant story tied in with the de-
velopment of the population, growth and living con-
ditions of the unincorporated areas of this State. 
During the past ten years there has been, in 
various Counties of Utah, a semi-urbanization of 
unincorporated areas. The problems attendant to 
this development have become particularly act1te 
in Salt Lake County. Magna, Hunter, Pleasant 
Green, Granger, Taylorsville, Granite Park, Union, 
Chesterfield, East Mill Creek, are examples of the 
types of communities that were in the minds of the 
men who drafted the statute being challenged. These 
are areas in which their leaders saw need for certain 
services, to-wit: water supply and sewage disposal, 
that could only be supplied by joint community ac-
tion. Private enterprise could not or did not meet the 
problems and people found the· necessity of turning 
to the Government for assistance. 
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One alternative was for the various areas in-
volved to incorporate and become municipalities, i.e., 
cities or towns. But there was and is no need for 
such areas to assume all the burdens and functions 
of incorporation. Many neecssary governmental ser-
vices are being provided by the County govern-
ments. 
However, the increased urbanization has cre-
ated a situation where the County government is 
inadequate and unable to meet the pressing needs of 
particular sections of the counties, yet there is no 
need or desire to assume many of the functions, 
burdens - taxwise and otherwise - attendant upon 
the creation of cities and towns. 
These areas are a cross between the urban and 
the rural, in a twilight zone of community develop-
ment where the County government cannot satisfy 
and the myriad functions of the municipality are 
not needed. There has been a compulsion and need 
for joint community action, but no legal devise or 
entity available for them to use to meet their needs. 
That need for a semi-city set-up gave rise to the 
creation of the "Improvement District," the creature 
of the law under discussion in this cause. It is in the 
mind of the writer a vital, essential tool and devise 
of community action, a vehicle equipped to negotiate 
a course of community effort between the anarchy 
of unincorporatedness and the over-government of 
a municipality. A course which no available govern-
mental vehicle has been equipped to travel. These 
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communities are governmental "hitch-hikers." They 
thumb a ride with the County part way, but the 
County can't carry them the entire distance. They 
can't afford and don't need the Cadillac proportions 
of a municipality, but do need some less ambitious 
and less complicated vehicle to transport them to 
satisfactory living conditions. The Improvement Dis-
trict provides that vehicle. 
THE LAW 
The writer will attempt to answer Plaintiff's 
Brief as it is set forth in its various sections. 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT SA. 
That the Legislature in enacting said 
statute exceeded its constitutional powers. 
This allegation recurs numerous times in a gen-
eral way in the Plaintiff's Brief in connection with 
other sections of the brief and with other alleged 
violations of the Constitution. However, the writer 
desires to cite the language of Mr. Justice Folland 
found in the case of Lehi City vs. Meiling, 48 Pac. 
2d at Page 534 (Utah) 1934 as a general answer 
to Plaintiff's charge. Judge Folland in his opinion 
upholding the constitutionality of Utah's Metropoli-
tan Water District Law quoted from the Utah case 
of Kimball vs. Grantsville City, 57 Pac. 1, using 
these words : 
"The State having thus committed its 
whole lawmaking power to the legislature, ex-
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cepting such as is expressly or impliedly with-
held by the State or Federal Constitution, it 
has plenary power for all purposes of Civil 
government. Therefore, in the absence of any 
constitutional restraint, express or implied, 
the legislature may act upon any subject with-
in the sphere of government. It may enact 
laws affecting the state at large, and all its 
people; and for the purpose of creating local 
jurisdictions it may establish districts, pro-
vide for the incorporation of towns and cities, 
and enact laws for the government of such 
districts and municipalities." 
The writer contends now and will contend later 
at greater length that for purposes of treating the 
constitutional provision regarding powers of the leg-
islature, the Metropolitan Water District Act and 
the Improvement District Act, here under discussion, 
are analogous. 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 8B. 
"That said statute violates the provisions 
of Article VI, Section 29 ... in that it dele-
gates to a special commission, private corpor-
ation or association power to assume, super-
vise or interfere with municipal functions ... 
The Constitutional provision involved reads as 
follows: 
_"The Legislature shall not delegate to 
any special commission, private corporation or 
association, any power to make, supervise or 
interfere with any municipal improvement, 
money, property or effects, whether held in 
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trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a 
capitol site, or to perform any municipal func-
tions.'' 
Defendant contends that Chapter 24, Laws of 
Utah, 1949, does not delegate to the Improvement 
District or its Board power to assume, supervise or 
interfere with municipal functions because the term 
"Municipal functions" as used in the constitutional 
.. .. provision as interpreted by the Utah Courts means 
the functions of a given city or town .. In other words, 
according to the interpretation of that section of the 
Constitution placed on it by the Supreme Court of 
Utah in the case of Logan City vs. Public Utilities 
Commission, 271 Pac. 961 (1928). The Constitution 
means: 
"No special commission, private corpor-
ation or association shall be delegated power 
to assume, supervise or interfere with the 
municipal functions of any particular or giv-
en city or town." 
In the Logan City vs. Public Utilities Commis-
sion of Utah case the facts were that the City of 
Logan owned and operated its own light and power 
plant and provided electricity for the inhabitants of 
the city. A conflict arose between the City and the 
Utah Power and Light Company and the parties 
took the matter before the Public Utilities Commis-
sion of Utah. Among other things the Commission, 
in an effort to achieve equity between the parties 
ordered the City of Logan to sell its electricity at 
certain rates. The matter was taken to the Supreme 
Court of Utah and the Court said that the Public 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
Utilities Commission could not set the city's electric 
rates because in doing that the Commission was 
interfering with a function of the municipality and 
in so doing was violating the Constitution. 
In the course of the opinions of members of the 
Court the purpose and meaning of the constitutional 
provision involved here was exhaustively analyzed. 
Mr. Justice Straup said at Page 972: 
''We think it clear that the undoubted 
purpose of the Constitutoinal provision is to 
hold inviolate the right of local self-govern-
ment of cities and towns with respect to muni-
cipal improvements, money, property, effects, 
the levying of taxes, and the performance of 
municipal functions." 
He referred to the contention of the Public Utilities 
Commission that it was not a "special commission" 
and therefore could interfere with the functions of 
the municipality without violating the constitutional 
provision. In discrediting that argument the Justice 
said: 
''We think such a construction of the sec-
tion is too narrow, and one which in effect 
impairs the very essence and purpose of it, 
deprives cities and towns of local self-govern-
ment, and interferes with their power to levy 
taxes and in the performance of their muni-
cipal corporate affairs with respect to their 
improvements, property and municipal func-
tions.'' 
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Both of the above qt1otations clearly reveal that 
the Court was not thinking of municipal functions 
in the abstract, but declaring that the writers of the 
Constitution had in mind the functions of a given, 
particular municipality, i. e., city or town. 
Then the Justice on Page 973 used language 
which supports our contention very pointedly when 
he said: 
"To say that the power of the Commis-
sion notwithstanding the Constitution, to su-
pervise, regulate and control the business and 
fix rates and charges of a municipally owned 
and operated plant is the same as that of a 
privately owned public utility, is to disregard 
or not give effect to the Constitution, for a 
municipality is specifically and exclusively 
mentioned therein, and the Constitution in 
such particular expressly a n d exclusively 
adopted for the benefit and protection of only 
municipalities." 
As indicated earlier in his opinion, the Justice 
meant cities and towns when he used the term muni-
cipalities. 
Judge Gideon in a concurring opinion treated 
the meaning of the constitutional provision in stat-
. 1ng: 
"What was intended by the adoption of 
this section? (Article VI, Section 29) To de-
termine the intent of the Constitution makers 
the language used by them must be and should 
be read in the light of the conditions in the 
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territory of Utah at the time of the adoption 
of the Constitution, as well as in the light 
of the history of the people and their institu-
tions at and prior to that time. Local self-gov-
ernment, or what is generally designated as 
'home rule', is not an innovation in this coun-
try. It is nothing new for municipalities, in 
Utah or elsewhere in the United States, to 
enjoy home rule or local self-government. The 
fact and the right of local self-government 
existed and was exercised from the earliest 
settlement of the various territories. The right 
was enjoyed long prior to the adoption of 
State Constitutions and the admission of the 
Territories into the Union as independent 
States. 
"Section 29 of Article VI of the Utah 
Constitution did not grant to municipalities 
the power to exercise the right of local self-
government, or to own and control property, 
or to own and operate a public utility for the 
benefit of the inhabitants of such municipali-
ties. These benefits the municipalities already 
enjoyed. On the contrary the section is a lim-
itation of the power of the Legislature to dele-
gate to any body, save only regularly elected 
officers of the municipalities, the right to su-
pervise or interfere with the property of the 
municipalities, or to perform any municipal 
functions. The purpose of the constitutional 
provision quoted was to guarantee to the mu-
nicipalities local self-government, and to deny 
to the Legislature any power to delegate to 
any body other than the local government the 
right of supervision over or interference with 
the property of the various municipalities 
within the state." 
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"Let it be conceded that in the absence of 
constitutional inhibition, the Legislature cot1ld 
take the government of the cities from the 
people residing therein and create new forms 
of government under the immediate control 
of the Legislatt1re. That is one thing. The 
delegation of the right to a commission, not 
the choice of the inhabitants, is quite another 
thing. The denial of the latter is what the 
above-quoted provision of the constitution, as 
I interpret it in the light of history, means." 
I don't see how Otlr Court could explain any 
more clearly tha11 two of its Judges have explained 
in this case that Section 29 of Article VI applies 
only to cities and towns and that the term "munici-
pal functions" when used in this constitutional pro-
vision means the functions being exercised by any 
given city or town. True the term "municipal func-
tions" is often used to describe functions which are 
of a nature and type ordinarily and traditionally 
exercised by cities and towns. But that is using the 
term "municipal functions" in a sense foreign and 
different from the simple meaning it has as used in 
our Constitution. 
Plaintiff's theory set forth with much munici-
palaver, is that the Constitution is using the term 
"municipal functions" in its abstract, nebulous 
meaning. Plaintiff believes the Constitution makers 
conceived of a municipal function as an itinerant 
ego that could detach itself from a muicipality, i. e., 
city or town, and wander at will to be captured and 
put to work by other governmental units such as 
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counties. A sort of "municipal function in the sky" 
theory. That theory of floating municipal functions 
is the meaning given to municipal functions by many 
courts and text writers and Plaintiff is not alone in 
using it. But according to the Court's words in the 
Logan City case, the writers of the Constitution 
were not using and did not intend to use the term 
municipal functions in that sense. They idetified a 
municipal fuction with a given municipality, i. e., 
city or town. 
Plantiff apparently believes that a municipal 
function may detach itself from a city or town and 
wander into the corral of a "County" and be lassoed, 
branded and used by a "County," but he doesn't 
think the Legislature has the right to allow any 
corporation, special commission or association or 
any governmental agency to use "municipal func-
tions." 
The Utah Court, the writer contends, asserts 
that the Constitution writers were not concerned 
about who used municipal functions in the abstract. 
They weren't concerned about who supplied water 
or electricity or abated mosquitoes or provided po-
lice protection or dug sewers or cleaned streets ; they 
only wanted to make sure that if a particular city 
or town was engaging in those activities, nobody 
could come into the city, kick the waterworks super-
intendent out of his office and take over his job. 
To further demonstrate the point that the con-
stitutional provision according to the Utah Court, 
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was designed to protect given, existing municipali-
ties from interference, and not to prevent the exer-
cise of "municipal functions" in the abstract, let us 
pursue to a conclusion in the light of the Logan 
City case, the "Abstract municipal function" or 
"municipal function in the sky" theory of the Plain-
tiff. Plaintiff will concede that a Utah city has the 
right to own and operate its own power system; 
Plaintiff must further concede that in the Logan 
City case the Court considered operation of such a 
system a municipal function. If Plaintiff's theory 
is that there are types of activity which are ''muni-
cipal functions" and which are "municipal func-
tions" no matter who performs them and that they 
can only be legally performed by municipalities (or 
counties) then the conclusion must follow that the 
Utah Power and Light Company, or any other pri-
vate power and light company, is performing "muni-
cipal functions" and doing so in violation of Article 
VI, Section 29 of the Constitution and should be 
enjoined. Why? Because private power and light 
companies are chartered and permitted to exist in 
the state by virtue of certain statutes passed by the 
Legislature. He must then argue that any statute 
which implements the establishment, existence and 
operation of a private power company is unconsti-
tutional because it delegates to a private corpora-
tion power to perform "municipal functions." 
The foregoing only illustrates the absurdity of 
the "municipal functions in the sky" theory as far 
as the interpretation of this section of the Constitu-
tion is concerned. , 
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The writer will grant that if Magna were an 
incorporated town or city and had its own city water 
system, and the Legislature delegated to an Im-
provement District the authority to dictate to Mag-
na City the water rates it should charge, or the 
size of pipe it should use, etc., then admittedly the 
statute would be delegating to the District power 
to assume, supervise or interfere with a function 
of the city of Magna and such a law would be un-
constitutional. But this law, of course, does not do 
that. 
To summarize the significance of the Utah 
Court's interpretation of the meaning of Article 
VI Section 29 of the Constitution we can say that 
the Court has rewritten the provision to clarify it 
and in the light of that court decision the Consti-
tutional provision reads. 
"The Legislature shall not delegate to 
any special Commission, private corporation 
or association any power to make, supervise 
or interfere with any Municipality's, that is 
city's or town's, improvement, money, prop-
erty or effects, whether held in trust or other-
wise, to levy taxes, to select a capitol site or 
to perform any functions of any given city 
or town.'' 
As previously indicated by the writer, Plaintiff 
enlarges on his doctrine of "municipal functions in 
the sky" by arguing that the functions of counties 
are "municipal functions." Certainly that is not true 
in contemplation of the meaning of. Article VI Sec-
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tion 29 as interpreted in the Logan City case. To 
repeat Mr. Justice Straup's words in reference to 
the application of the constitutional provision: 
" .... for a municipality is specifically 
and exclusively mentioned therein, and the 
Constitution in such particular expressly and 
exclusively adopted for the benefit and protec-
tion of on.ly municipalities." 
Other language of the Cot1rt quoted above indicates 
clearly that the Court meant cities and towns when 
it used the term "municipalities" and thus the Court 
confines the application of that constitutional pro-
vision to cities and towns and that constitutional 
provision can not be relied tlpon by counties to pre-
vent the assumption or supervision of or interfer-
ence with their functions. 
Even if we assumed for sake of argument that 
Article VI Section 29 was designed to spread its 
cloak of protection over County governments, still 
this statute does not enable an Improvement Dis-
trict to assume, supervise or interfere with func-
tions of the County if the County does not want it 
to do so for the statute itself protects the County. 
An Improvement District is established and created 
by the Board of County Commissioners under au-
thority of the statute and nothing in the statute 
requires or constrains the County Commission to 
establish a District if it does not desire to do so. 
The words of the first section of the statute, Chap-
ter 24, Session Laws of Utah 1949, reads as fol-
lows: 
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"The Board of County Commissioners of 
each County in this State may hereafter estab-
lish in the manner hereinafter provided, one 
or more improvement districts in such coun-
t " y .... 
The machinery for the estalishment of the district 
is operated by the County Commission. Nothing ap-
pears in the statute which makes it mandatory on 
the commission to create a district and the statute 
provides no other method by which an improvement 
district can be established. 
From the two standpoints set forth above then 
it is fallacious to argue that the law in question 
violates Article VI Section 29 of the Constitution 
as far as counties are concerned. 
This Court was faced with an interpretation of 
this section of the Constitution in adjudicating the 
constitutionality of the Metropolitan Water District 
Act in the case of Lehi City vs. Meiling, 48 Pac. 2d 
530,. decided in 1934. As far as the application of 
this section of the Constitution is concerned the 
Metropolitan Water District and the Improvement 
District are analogous. Their functions and pur-
poses generally are the same. 'They are both created 
by authorization of State Statutes. They fill a need 
not satisfied by existing City or County govern-
ments. The Titles of the two acts involved indicate 
their similarity. The Title of the Metropolitan Wa-
ter District Act reads as follows : 
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"An Act providing for the Incorporation, 
Government and Management of Metropoli-
tan Water Districts, Authorizing Such Dis-
tricts to Inctlr Bonded Debt and to Acquire, 
Construct, Operate and Manage Works and 
Property, providing for the Taxation of Prop-
erty Therein and the Performance of Cer-
tain Functions Relating Thereto by Officers 
of Counties, Providing for the Addition of 
Area Thereto and the Exclusion of Area 
Therefrom and At1thorizing Municipal Cor-
porations to Aid and Participate in the In-
corporation of Such Districts." 
The Title of the Improvement District Act 
reads: 
"An Act Authorizing the Creation of 
Improvement Di$tricts in the Various Coun-
ties of the State, Providing for the Govern-
ment and Powers of Such Districts, Authoriz-
ing the Acquisition of Improvements by such 
Districts, and the Issuance of Bonds of the 
District in Payment Therefor, Providing for 
the Levy of Taxes to pay such bonds as May 
be Issued Hereunder Payable From Taxes and 
for the Levy of Taxes to Carry Out the Pur-
pose for Which Such Bonds as are Not pay-
able for Taxes, Granting the Power of Emi-
nent Domain to such Districts, Providing 
for Issuance of Refunding Bonds by Such 
Districts and Making Certain Provisions with 
Respect to the Foregoing ... " 
The similarity of purposes of the two Districts 
is documented by the statements of those purposes 
in the statute. Section 100-10-3 sets forth the pur-
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pose of the Metropolitan Water District in the fol-
lowing words : 
"Metropolitan Water District may be or-
ganized hereunder for the purpose of acquir-
ing, appropriating, developing, storing, sell-
ing, leasing and distributing water for, and 
devoting water to, municipal and domestic 
purposes, irrigation, power, milling, manu-
facturing and any and all other beneficial 
uses ... " 
The purpose of the Improvement District is 
set forth in Chapter 24 Section 1 as follows: 
" . . . any district so created shall have 
authority through construction, purchase, gift 
or condemnation, or any combination there-
of, to acquire and operate all or any part of 
the following, or any combination thereof: 
" ( 1) Systems for the supply, treatment 
and distribution of water; and 
'' ( 2) ~ystems for the collection, treat-
ment and disposition of sewage." 
As far as the handling of water is concerned 
the Improvement District is designed to do the 
same thing for unincorporated areas that the Metro-
politan Water District is designed to do for in-
corporated areas. Added to the general purposes and 
powers of the Improvement Districts is the power 
to handle sewage - a vital, critical consideration 
in many unincorporated areas in Utah and a natur-
al concommitant of the task of providing water. 
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In the Meiling case it was contended that the 
Metropolitan Water District Act violated Article VI 
Section 29 because the act delegated power to a 
special commission, private corporation or associa-
tion to assume, supervise or interfere with a muni-
cipal improvement and to perform municipal func-
tions. Striking down that contention Mr. Justice 
Folland, speaking for the Court, said at page 535: 
"The contention cannot be sustained for 
the reason that the board of directors to whom 
the management and control of the district 
has been intrusted, and which is to exercise 
the powers and perform the functions of the 
public agency thus created, does not come 
within the designation 'special commission, 
private corporation or association' to which 
the inhibitions of the sections apply." 
The justice then cited the case of City of Pasa-
dena vs. Chamberlain and proceeded: 
"Nor does the act provide for interfer-
ence with any municipal improvement, money, 
property or effects. The power of control 
vested in the board of directors is over the 
property, improvements, money, and effects 
of the district, and not that of any of the 
cities or towns whose territorial boundaries 
may be coincidental with that of the district 
or included therein. The powers of the board 
are limited by the act to the levying of taxes 
for the public purposes mentioned therein .... · 
None of the municipal functions of the com-
ponent cities or towns is conferred on or dele-
gated to the Metropolitan Water District. 
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Each of such cities and towns will possess and 
may continue to exercise every municipal 
function it now has. There need be no fric-
tion between the two, but the closest coopera-
tion is contemplated and should result." 
The activities of the Magna Water District or 
any other Improvement District will not interfere 
with the activities of any municipality and the ac-
tivities of the Magna Water District do not and will 
not conflict with any activities of Salt Lake County. 
The Plaintiff in his Brief indicates that Salt Lake 
County is considering furnishing water to the entire 
county. That is not true. Salt Lake County is con-
sidering sponsoring of a County Wide Conservancy 
District to provide the main distribution lines and 
act as wholesaler of the water to various cities, 
towns, improvement districts and private water 
companies. The County is not considering going into 
the retail water business. 
In the opinion of the writer there is less reason 
to believe an Improvement District will interfere, 
etc., with municipal functions than there is to be-
lieve the same of a Metropolitan Water District, 
because cities are necessarily located within the 
boundaries of a metropolitan water district, and in 
some instances such as in the case of Salt Lake City 
and Provo the boundar~es of the Districts and of the 
cities are co-terminous. Yet in the case of Provo City 
vs. Evans, 48 Pac. 2d 555, decided in 1935, the 
Supreme Court of Utah followed its decision in the 
Lehi City case and upheld the constitutionality of 
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the law even though the boundaries of the District 
and the city were identical. In Salt Lake City the 
same situation exists. The District has power to tax 
exactly the same people as the City has authority to 
tax. The District and the City are both engaged in 
the water bt1siness. Yet the excellent and effective 
manner in which the two have worked together to 
provide Salt Lake City with a secure source of water 
supply has vindicated the statement of Justice Fol-
land quoted above to the effect that: 
"There need be no friction between the 
two, but the closest cooperation is contem-
plated and should result." 
There is every reason to believe that similar 
cooperation should and will exist between Improve-
ment Districts and County Governments which cre-
ate them. If .the Counties do not want the Districts, 
if they are afraid of encroachment, interference, 
etc., the counties do not have to create them. 
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PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 8B. 
"That said Statute violates the provis-
ions of . . . . Article XI Section 5. Article XI 
Section 5 reads: 'Corporations for municipal 
purposes shall not be created by special laws. 
The Legislature by general laws shall pro-
vide for the incorporation, organization and 
classification of cities and towns in propor-
tion to population, which laws may be al-
tered, amended or repealed'." 
Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that the above 
section of the Constitution is violated by the law 
under consideration and in his Brief he joins to 
this Section Article VI Section 26 which reads in 
part: 
"In all cases where a general law can be 
applicable, no special law shall be enacted." 
Treating Section 5 of Article XI first. The Im-
provement District Law does not violate that sec-
tion because: (1) it does not create a corporation; 
(2) it does not create districts for "municipal pur-
poses" as that term is used in the Constitution; and 
(3) the law is not a special law, but a general law 
applicable to the entire state and potentially of bene-
fit directly or indirectly to all the people of the State 
whether they live in incorporated or unincorporated 
areas. For example: Murray residents may be ex-
tremely interested in what East Mill 'creek or Gran-
ite Park do with their sewage. 
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In the light of the interpretation of this section 
of our Constitution by our Court the Section should 
correctly and more accurately read: 
"Corporations for municipal purposes 
shall not be created by special laws. The Leg-
islature by general laws shall provide for the 
incorporation, organization, and classification 
of municipalities, ie: Cities and Towns in 
proportion to population, etc." 
This interpretation is borne out by the contents 
of the remainder of the Section of the Constitution. 
Those contents deal solely with he creation, govern-
ment, functions, etc., of cities and towns. 
If the Constitution had said no public agency or 
legal entity shall be created by general or special 
law for the purpose of exercising any functions 
which are exercised by cities and towns, then· the 
Plaintiff would have something. Plaintiff is trying 
to contort the language of the section to read that 
way, but it does not read that way. 
It appears to the writer that the Plaintiff does 
not recognize that the writers of the Constitution in 
using the words"Municipal," "municipality," "muni-
cipal purposes" and "municipal functions" had in 
mind only cities and towns and not municipal func-
tions in the abstract. 
The writers of the Constitution in that section 
were not concerned about preventing the creation of 
corporations or districts or public agencies to han-
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dle water, irrigation, drainage, sewage or mosquito 
abatement problems, all of which may be considered 
municipal functions in the abstract. They put that 
provision in the Constitution to prevent the Legis-
lature from creating cities and towns by special 
laws. 
Proceeding to the treatment of this problem by 
the Utah Court, the Court in deciding the case cited 
supra, Lehi City vs. Meiling, declared that the Met-
ropolitan Water District Act does not violate. Article 
VI Section 26 because, said the Court, the law was 
not a special law, but a general law. Mr. Justice 
Folland said on page 536, headnote 4: 
"It is urged the act is special and not 
general, in violation of Article VI Section 26, 
to the effect that 'in all cases where a general 
law can be applicable, no special law shall be 
enacted.' The act purports to be a general law 
applicaple to all portions of the State and 
makes available to the inhabitants of all cities 
and towns seeKing to take advantage of its 
provisions, the opportunity of organizing 
Metropolitan Water Districts. The mere 
fact that its benefits may, under present op-
portunities and conditions, be availed of by 
a part of the State only, does not mitigate 
against its validity as a ·general law. City of 
Pasadena vs. Chamberlain, supra. While only 
one group of cities or towns may now attempt 
to organize under its provisions, yet at any 
future time other cities and towns may do 
likewise. The act is not limited to any par-
ticular cities or towns, or to any particular 
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locality in the State, but it operates uniformly 
on every city or town which may choose to 
take advantage of its provisions. In form as 
well as in substance, it is a general law and 
not special." 
Similar language could be used with regard to 
the Improvement District Act. 'The act is a general 
law applicable to all portions of the State and makes 
available to the inhabitants of all unincorporated 
areas, seeking to take advantage of its provisions, 
the opportunity of organizing improvement dis-
tricts. The mere fact that its benefits may, under 
present opportunities and conditions, be availed of 
by a part of the State only, does not mitigate against 
its validity as a general law. While only one unin-
corporated area may now attempt to organize under 
its provisions, yet at any future time other unincor-
porated areas may do likewise. The act is not liln-
ited to any particular unincorporated area or to 
any particular locality in the State, but it operates 
uniformly on every unincorporated area which may 
choose to take advantage of its provisions. In form 
as well as in substance it is a general law and not 
a special law. 
The writer believes the opinion of our Court 
in the case of Patterick vs. Carbon County Conserv-
ancy District, 145 Pac. 2d 503 ( 1944), is in point 
on this matter as well as with regard to many other 
matters later treated herein. That case was brought 
before the Court in an original proceeding to test 
the constitutionality of the Water Conservancy Act. 
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For purposes of this constitutional question (gen-
eral or special law) the conservancy district and the 
improvement district are closely analogous. The 
purpose of the conservancy district is stated in its 
declaration of policy found in Section 100-11-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, Paragraph (g) and its sub-
paragraphs: 
" ( 1) To control, make use of and apply 
to beneficial use all unappropriated waters in 
this State to a direct and supplemental use of 
such waters for domestic, manufacturing, ir-
rigation, power and other beneficial uses. 
"(2) To obtain from water in Utah the 
highest duty for domestic uses and irrigation 
of lands in Utah within the terms of inter-
state compacts or otherwise." 
The Conservancy District is a legal entity -
not a city, not a county - to deal with the use of 
water. It is conceived for broader application, geo-
graphically speaking, than the Improvement Dis-
trict and it may include both incorporated and unin-
corporated areas and it may transcend the boun-
daries of one County. However, the general nature 
of its functions is the same as that of the Improve-
ment District. It is created by authority of a Legis-
lative enactment as is the Improvement District. 
The Petitioner in the Conservancy District case 
contended that the Water Conservancy District Act 
violated Section 26, Article VI of the Constitution 
in that it was a "special law." Attacking that prob-
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lem, Mr. Justice Wade said at page 511 of the 
opinion: 
" .... Sec. 100-11-15 does not violate 
Section 26 Article VI of the Constitution of 
Utah since a water conservancy district is not 
organized under a special law and being a 
quasi-mt1nicipal corporation formed for pub-
lic purposes it is within the discretion of the 
Legislature to grant it any powers, not ex-
pressly inhibited by the Constitution, to fur-
ther such purposes, including the power of 
taxation. It is the public purposes for which 
a water conservancy district is organized that 
distinguishes it from drainage or irrigation 
districts. The public purposes for which a 
water conservancy district is organized inures 
to the benefit of the public generally and 
therefore the public can be charged for such 
benefits through general taxation." 
The Court cites the Lehi :City case in support. 
Patterick also contended Section 5, Article XI 
was violated in that the law created a corporation 
for municipal purposes by special law. The Court 
said at Page 511 the allegation that that section 
of the Constitution was violated had 
"no merit - as these Constit11tional inhibi-
tions apply only to cities, towns and villages 
and subdiivsions of such cities, towns and vil-
lages, and do not apply to water conservancy 
districts which are not municipalities in con-
templation of that term as used in the Con~ 
stitution.'' 
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We submit that an Improvement District is 
not a city, town or village or subdivision of the same 
and that the law authorizing its creation does not 
violate Article XI Section 5 of the Constitution. The 
reasoning used by the Court in determining the con-
stitutionality of the Metropolitan Water District 
Act and the Water Conservancy Act is just as prop-
erly applied to the Improvement District Act. 
PLAINTIFF.'S COMPLAINT 8C. 
"That said statute is in violation of Ar-
ticle V of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah in that said statute is so vague and in-
definite that were the courts to interpret the 
same the courts would be required to act in a 
legislative rather than a judicial capacity." 
This allegation appears to the writer to be specious. 
If every statute were to be declared unconstitutional 
because some phrases, clauses, sentences or words 
in it were subject to interpretation in the light of 
varying factual situations, then all the laws of Utah 
and every other State should be declared unconsti-
tutional in toto. If all statutes were poured in con-
crete and subject to no interpretation there would be 
no need for courts, little need for attorneys, and the 
West Publishing Company would have to close its 
doors. 
A. Plaintiff claims to be worried about the 
phrase "and the boundaries of no district shall over-
lap the boundaries of any other district." It is ob-
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vious from reading the statute that the words ''any 
other district" refer to any other Improvement Dis-
trict. The members of the Legislature presumably 
know that every square foot of ground in Utah is 
located in some school district so it is specious to 
conceive that by using the words "any other dis-
trict," the Legislature intended to prevent the bor-
ders of an Improvement District from overlapping 
those of some other type of "district." 
B. In paragraph B, Plaintiff contends the 
words "where title to any real property in the dis-
trict is held in the name of more than one person, all 
the persons holding title thereto must join in the 
signing of the written protest," are ambiguous. 
Their meaning seems perfectly clear to the writer. 
It appears to the writer that the above language is 
clearer and leaves less to interpretation than the 
language of the Water Conservancy Act which pro-
vides in Section 100-11-7, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943: 
"A petition may be filed ... signed by 
not fewer than twenty-five per cent of the 
owners of irrigated land in said proposed dis-
trict.'' 
Yet the Courts of Utah have had no trouble with 
that particular language in the conservancy district 
Act in the nine years the law has been in effect. 
, 
C. Plaintiff worries about the language_ "the 
deed records of the county shall be accepted as final 
and conclusive evidence of the ownership of the real 
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property of the district." Plaintiff asks about own-
ers whose deeds are not recorded, equity owners, 
etc. The requirement in tne statute that proof of 
ownrship must be based on deed records, it appears 
to the writer, reduces confusion as to "ownership" 
to a mi~imum. The Conservancy Act in setting up 
the procedure for signing petitions and protests uses 
only the word "owner" without providing any fur-
ther standard for a Court to look to. I think Plain-
tiff's argument, if lodged against the conservancy 
act, would be much more credible than directed 
against the improvement district act, for the latter 
act is clearer, more explicit, less subject to interpre-
tation than the conservancy district act. Yet the 
conservancy act has been in operation nine years 
and though it has been tested by the Supreme Court 
and amended by the Legislature, no need has been 
found to interpret or change the word "owner" as 
used in connection with petitions and protests pro-
vided for in the act. 
The writer thinks it unnecessary to treat sub-
paragraph D, E and F of Plaintiff.'s Brief in de-
tail. It should be sufficient to say there is no evidence 
that this act is any more ambiguous, uncertain or 
more subject to interpretation than any other act 
of the Legislature, and if it does contain some am-
biguities, it is the function of the Courts to inter-
pret and clarify. 
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PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 8D. 
"That said statt1te violates the provisions 
of Article I, Sections 7 and 11 of the Con-
stitution of the State of Utah, in this, that 
the statute does not provide for adequate re-
view by the Courts, and in fact prohibits or 
limits review." 
Article I, Section 7, reads: 
"No person shall be deprived of life, lib-
erty or property without due process of law." 
Article I, Section 11, reads : 
"All Courts shall be open, and every per-
son for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be adminis-
tered without denial or unnecessary delay; 
and no person shall be barred from prosecut-
ing or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause 
to which he is a party." 
Great pains were taken by the writers of this 
statute to protect the property rights of individuals 
within the district and to provide them with ample 
opportunity for protests and appeal. The writers of 
the statute, it appears, bent over backwards to give 
property owners in the district a chance to present 
their complaints. Note the procedure required by 
the statute to be followed: 
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1. HEARING ON ESTABLISHMENT OF 
DISTRICT. 
"County Commission shall give notice of 
its intention to establish such district, which 
notice shall define the area to be included 
therein and the boundaries thereof, shall gen-
erally describe the nature and extent of the 
improvements proposed, with estimated cost, 
and such notice shall designate one of sev-
eral different kinds of material or forms of 
construction.'' 
All of which was done in the creation of the Magna 
District. Publication of the notice for five weeks is 
required of a hearing to be held not less than 45 
days after the publication of the first notice 
"at which time and place all interested parties 
may appear before said board of County Com-
missioners and be heard either in support of 
or in opposition to the creation of said pro-
posed district." (Chapter 24, Section 3.) 
2. WRITTEN PROTEST. 
In addition to attending the hearing and 
protesting in person, Section 3 provides: "Any 
taxpayer within said district may on or before .. 
said date so fiixed, protest against the estab-
lishment of such district, in writing, signed 
by the taxpayer, which protest shall be filed 
with the County Clerk ... '' 
"If, ... written protest shall be filed 
signed by owners representing more than one-
half of the assessed value of taxable property 
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within the said proposed district, the district 
shall not be established . . . " 
3. WRIT OF REVIEW. 
"Any property owner who shall have filed 
a written protest ... and whose property has 
been included, notwithstanding such protest, 
may within 30 days after the adoption of the 
resolution establishing the district, apply to 
the District Court . . . for a writ of review 
of the actions of the board ... but only upon 
the ground that his property will not be bene-
fited by the proposed improvements, or upon 
the ground that the proceedings in establish-
ing the district have not been in compliance 
with the provisions of the statute." Chapter 
24, Section 3, Laws of Utah, 1949. 
What more does the property owner want? The 
law requires the commission to make a finding that 
his land will be benefiited and it requires that the 
nature and extent of the Improvements be set forth 
in the notice of hearing; the property owner may file 
a written protest and he may protest in person be-
fore the Board and he has at least 45 days before 
the hearing to urge others to protest; then he can 
"appeal" to the district court if he believes his prop-
erty will not be benefiited or if he thinks the pro-
cedure required by the law has not been followed. 
But that isn't the end of his right to object·and 
"protect" his property, as will appear below. 
4. HEARING ON BOND ELECTION. 
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Before bonds can be issued (Chapter 24, Sec-
tion 4) fifty real property owners must petition for 
a bond election and the commission must give notice 
of a hearing 
"Which notice shall inform all persons 
concerned of the time and place of the hearing 
and of their right to appear ... and contend 
for or protest the ordering of such bond elec-
tion. Such notice shall state the amount of 
bonds proposed to be issued ... ~' 
The property owner has at least 30 days to think 
about that and arouse public opinion before the 
hearing. 
5. WRITTEN PROTEST. 
The property owner has another chance to file 
a \Vritten protest against calling the election and 
he may appear in person or by attorney at the hear-
ing. The Commission must again determine 
"That the proposed improvements would 
be for the benefit of all taxable property situ-
a ted in the district ... " (Chapter 24 Section 
5.) 
Again if the written protests represent more 
than fifty per cent in value of the real property in 
the district 
"The board shall not have authority to 
proceed with the calling of the election." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
37 
6. BOND ELECTION. 
The property owner has another chance to "pro-
tect" his property by voting against the issuance of 
the bonds and by inducing others to do the same. 
The Plaintiff says, ''The burden of beating a 
bond election is an excessive burden on the protest-
ant, the statute provides no recourse to the Courts 
for review." Plaintiff is saying in effect "After the 
property owner has been advised as to the nature 
and extent of the improvements, after the commis-
sion has determined his property will be benefiited-
after he has had a chance to appeal to a court to 
force the Commission to prove that it has advised 
him of the nature and extent of the improvements 
and to prove that his property will be benefited; 
after he has had a chance to protest in writing twice, 
in person twice at hearings and vote in an elec;.. 
tion, then," says the Plaintiff, "if he doesn't like the 
way the election turned out-the way the people in 
his community voted, he should be able to appeal to 
the courts." In other words, Plaintiff believes one 
protestant and one judge should be able to out-vote 
all the remainder of the people in the community. 
Many Republicans have felt that way . after 
elections for the last 18 years, but as yet they have 
not been given the right to appeal the result of an 
election, unless there was something irregular in 
the election. The property owner in this case, as the 
Republican, may resort to the Cour.ts by extraor-
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dinary writ, to challenge the bond election if he 
believes it has been conducted irregularly. 
The Utah Court, in the case of Lehi City vs. 
Meiling, it seems to the writer, clearly and con-
clusively answers the argument of the Plaintiff. The 
writer has already delineated some of the similari-
ties between the Metropolitan Water District Act 
and the Improvement District Act and pointed out 
they are analogous from the standpoint of pur-
poses and functions. The Metropolitan Water Dis-
trict Act was upheld in spite of the fact that it pro-
vides no means by which landowners assessed could 
be heard on the question of benefits. The Improve-
ment District Act does provide a writ of review to 
the District Court allowing the property owner to 
be heard on the question of benefits. Taxation im-
posed by the Improvement District is a general ad 
valorem tax similar to general taxation and not an 
assessment for benefits conferred or to be conferred 
on any particular property. It is a tax identical in 
nature with the tax which a Metropolitan Water 
District is empowered to impose. 
The subject of the nature of the tax, its impli-
cations as far as appeal and hearing and due pro-
cess are concerned are treated by the Utah Court 
in the Lehi City case at Page 536 of the opinion. The 
writer desires to quote at length from that case 
because he believes it conclusively answers the con-
tentions of the Plaintiff as to matters of appeal and 
due process. Mr. Justice Folland said: 
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" ( 5) It is contended the act violates the 
due process clauses of the State and Federal 
Constitutions, in that taxing powers conferred 
on the district are in the nature of assess-
ments for benefits and no provision is made 
for the landowners assessed to be heard on 
the question of benefits. The objection is not 
well taken, because the tax provided to be 
imposed is a general ad valorem tax similar 
to general taxation and not an assessment 
for benefits as such is known in connection 
with drainage, irrigation, and. other special 
assessment districts. The right of the property 
owner to be heard before a competent tribunal 
on the question of benefits is essential to avoid~ 
running counter to the constitutional require-
ments of due process before the imposition of 
burdens which might result in depriving a 
landowner of his property by means of special 
assessments. Argyle v. Johnson, 39 Utah 500, 
118 P. 487; State ex rel. Lundberg v. Green 
River Irrigation District, 40 Utah 83, 119 P. 
1039. The people of the district have oppor-
tunity to be heard with respect to the or-
ganization of the district, and this carries 
with it, if adopted and approved by the voters, 
the power of taxation on all property within 
the district for the purposes of the district. 
Provision is made in the act for the imposi-
tionof such taxes on the property as assessed 
and valued for purposes of general taxation 
so that the property owners have a right to be 
heard as to the valuation of their property 
the same as when such property is levied upon 
for general taxes. This same objection was the 
strongest and most important one urged 
against validity of the Metropolitan Water 
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· District Act before the Supreme Court of 
California in City of Pasadena vs. Chamber-
lain, supra. The Court gave such a satisfac-
tory explanation of the grounds on which it 
sustained the validity of the legislation in the 
face of such objection that we can do no 
better than adopt their reasons and quote ful-
ly from that decision: 
" 'This contention presents precisely the 
same question which was presented to this 
court in several recent cases. Henshaw v. Fos-
ter, 176 Cal. 507, 169 P. 82; Miller & Lux v. 
Board of Supervisors, 189 Cal. (254), 255, 
208 P. 304; In re Orosi Public Utility 'Dis-
trict, 196 Cal. 45, 235 P. 1004. An examina-
tion of these cases will serve to show that the 
former distinction sought to be drawn be-
tween what are governmental and what are 
proprietary powers to be exercised by public 
corporations, in so far as the maintenance of 
these by general taxation is concerned, is fast 
fading out of our jurisprudence. The most 
recent case, above cited, aptly expresses this 
tendency, werein it says: 
"'We take it to be now a general ac-
cepted proposition that, while a municipality, 
which undertakes to supply those of its in-
habitants who will pay therefor with utilities 
and facilities of urban life, is performing a 
function not governmental, but more often 
committed to private corporations ... with 
whom it may come into competition, it is, in 
fact, engaging in business upon municipal 
capital, and for municipal purposes ... ' 
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" 'The supplying of water for domestic 
uses within municipalities has grown of re-
cent years to be one of the most common and 
well-recognized forms of municipal activities 
wherein public property is employed and 
wherein public taxation is imposed and col-
lected upon the inhabitants of the municipali-
ties regardless of benefits conferred upon par-
ticular property, and by the same method by 
which taxes are generally levied and collected 
for the carrying on of the governmental func-
tions of incorporated cities and towns. Muni-
cipal corporations, whether organized under 
special charters or general laws, derive these 
particular powers from the same legal sources 
as those which provide for the organization 
of quasi municipal corporations such as that 
provided for in this act, and we can perceive 
no real distinction between the organization 
of a municipal corporation, strictly so-called, 
for the carrying forth of the purposes usually 
committed to such governmental agencies and 
the organization under legislative sanction of 
such other governmental agencies as munici-
pal water districts or public utility districts 
or metropolitan water districts, which, 'vhile 
these may not exercise all of the functions 
committed to municipal corporations, strictly 
so-called, are empowered to exercise certain 
of these functions which have come to be re-
cognized as at least quasi governmental in 
character. Nor can we perceive any substan-
tial reason why such district when so organ-
ized may not be invested with the same powers 
in the matter of the levying and collection of 
taxes for the carrying forth of its limited pur-
poses with which municipal corporations are 
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invested for the carrying forth of similar, 
though more diversified purposes. Nor can we · 
discover any rational theory upon which in 
the levy and collection of such taxes the pow-
ers of either should be limited in the forma-
tion of that class of public agencies wherein 
the assessments imposed upon a particular 
property have such direct reference to bene-
fits conferred as to require notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing to be given to the owners 
of the property to be affected by the assess-
ments thus to be imposed. The decision last 
above cited expressly holds that any tax levied 
and imposed for the purpose of supplying 
capital for the foregoing municipal or quasi 
municipal purposes is not to be regarded as 
'a tax or assessment on property directly 
benefited by the construction of some local im-
provement, but is a general tax levied just as, 
and for the same purpose that, any general 
municipal tax is imposed for carrying on the 
governmental functions and utilitarian ob-
jects of duly incorporated cities or towns.' 
We are constrained, therefore, to the con-
clusion that the Legislature in investing met-
ropolitan water districts to be formed under 
the provisions of the act in question with 
power, through their properly appointed of-
ficials, to collect general taxes within the 
municipalities uniting in the formation of 
such districts for the common purpose of sup-
plying each with water for domestic uses has 
not acted in violation of any provision of the 
state Constitution to which our attention has 
been directed'.'' 
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For further authority on the subject of wheth-
er or not the taxes which can be imposed by action 
of the Improvement District are special improve-
ment taxes or general taxes, the writer wishes to 
again refer to the Patterick vs. Carbon County Con-
servancy District case. The writer has already de-
lineated to some extent the similarities in purpose 
and function of the Conservancy District and the 
Improvement District. At page 511 of the Patterick 
case the court said : 
"The public purposes for which a water 
conservancy district is organized inures to the 
benefit of the public generally and therefore 
the public can be charged for such benefits 
through general taxation." 
The chief benefits to be received by a commun-
ity from the improvements authorized by the im-
provement district act are adequate culinary water, 
adequate fire protection and adequate sewage treat-
ment and disposal. Those benefits are obviously of 
such a nature as to benefit every person in the com-
munity. The Plaintiff states he will complain if he 
is taxed and doesn't receive better water or better 
pressure in his particular home, or better fire pro-
tection for his particular house. Plaintiff forgets _ 
that earlier in his Brief he made reference to the 
destruction of the school house in Magna by fire be-
cause there was not sufficient wat~r pressure to com-
bat the blaze. Providing facilities which would aid 
in preventing a recurrence of a school house destruc-
tion would certainly benefit the Plaintiff in one way 
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or another. Perhaps it would assist his child's edu-
cation, or save his child's life, or save him from an 
increase in taxation required to build a new school 
house, etc. The point is, an improved water system 
in Magna would be of benefit to the Plaintiff even 
if the Plaintiff refused to connect onto the system 
and insisted on drilling his own private well. 
In the case of Lundberg vs. Green River Irri-
gation District, 119 Pac. 1039, the constitutionality 
of the Utah Irrigation District law was challenged. 
Under that law the assessment was based on the 
benefits given to particular lands included within 
the district and the Court denominated the assess-
ment as a special assessment and not a general tax. 
Admittedly where special assessments are involved 
the landowner must be given an opportunity to be 
heard before a proper tribunal on the question of 
benefits to his land - a requirement not imposed 
on a law which provides for services which benefit 
the public generally as is the case with the Metro-
politan Water, Conservancy and Improvement Dis-
trict laws .. Justice Frick wrote the opinion in the 
case and on page 1040 he stated: 
"The Plaintiff bases his application for a 
permanent writ upon the assertion that Chap-
ter 74 (Irrigation District Act) is violative 
of certain provisions of our Constitution, and 
that said chapter is therefore void, and hence 
the organization of the district and the issu-
ance of said bonds are without authority of 
law. It is provided in said Chapter 74 that, 
whenever a majority of the landowners who 
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own the larger portion of the lands within a 
proposed irrigation district desire to provide 
for irrigation, they may present a petition 
to the Board of County Commissioners of the 
County in which the larger portion of the 
lands sought to be incorporated into an irri-
gation district are situated, asking that such 
a district be organized. The board of commis-
sioners are required to give notice of the 
pendency of the petition, and upon a hearing 
must determine and fix the boundaries of the 
proposed district. The commissioners are also 
prohibited from excluding any lands from the 
proposed district that are susceptible to irri-
gation by the same system of water works 
applicable to other lands in said proposed dis-
trict; nor shall any land which will not in the 
judgment of the board be benefited by said 
proposed system be included in such district 
if the owner thereof shall make application 
at such hearing to withdraw the same." 
After setting forth the provisions of the law 
the Justice on page 1041 treats the subject of due 
process as follows : 
"The first ground of attack, namely that 
the Plaintiff is deprived of his property with-
out due process of law by what is contained in 
said Chapter 7 4, is fully answered in the 
negative by the Supreme Court of California 
in Irrigation District vs. Williams, 18 Pac. 
379." 
Then the Justice cites another case on which 
the Utah Court is relying. Then referring to the 
law he states: 
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"In said chapter the landowner is given 
an opportunity to be heard, and is provided 
with a proper tribunal to hear him, as to any 
objections he may have to urge against includ-
ing his lands within the boundaries of the 
proposed irrigation district." 
Even though the irrigation district law involves 
special assessments, demanding the right to be heard 
on the question of benefits and the Improvement Dis-
trict law provides for benefits to the public general-
ly and thus requires no hearing as to benefits yet the 
hearing provided for in the irrigation district law 
is not as extensive as that provded for in the Im-
provement District law. The Improvement District 
law, while not required to go as far as the Irriga-
tion District Act, goes further. It not only provides 
for hearings before the County Commission and for 
written protests to the commission, but it provides 
for a writ of review to the District Court on the 
question of benefits. 
To summarize- the tax authorized by the Im-
provement District is a general tax. To satisfy the 
demands of the due process clause of the constitu-
tion there was no constituional need to provide for 
landowners assessed to be heard on the question of 
benefits. Yet the writers of the law bent over back-
wards and provided for the landowner to be heard 
first before the County Com~ission. That in itself 
was enough to satisfy the constitutional demands 
of an Irrigation District law where special assess-
ments were involved. But this improvement dis-
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trict act goes even further in consulting constitu-
tional rights than is required of an irrigation dis-
trict. It provides for a writ of review of the com-
mission's action by the District Court. There should 
be no doubt but that the act is constiutional as. far 
as the due process clause is concerned. 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 8E. 
"That said statute violates Article I Sec-
tion 4 of the Constitution of the State of Utah 
in that it requires property qualifications to 
vote, and further that it violates Article IV 
Sections 2 and 7 by requiring more qualifica-
tions to vote in an election than are specified 
in the Constitution of the State of Utah." 
The part of Article I Section 4 to which Plain-
tiff refers is the last sentence of the section which 
reads: 
"No property qualifications shall be re-
quired of any person to vote, or hold office, 
except as provided in this constitution." 
Article IV Section 2 reads : 
"Every citizen of the United States, of the 
age of twenty-one years and upwards, who 
shall have been a citizen for ninety days, and 
shall have resided in the State or Territory 
one year, in the county four months, and in 
the precinct sixty days next preceding any 
election, shall be entitled to vote at such elec-
tion, except as herein otherwise provided." 
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Article IV Section 7 reads: 
"Except in elections levying a special tax 
or creating indebtedness, no property qualifi-
cations shall be required for any person to 
vote or hold office." 
The Section of the Constitution last quoted is 
the answer to Plaintiff's contention. The Improve-
ment District law provides for property qualifica-
tions in connection with the vote of approval of the 
bonds. Clearly that is an election "creating indebt-
edness" and comes under the constitutional excep-
tion. 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 8F. 
"That said statute is in violation of Ar-
ticle I Section 7, and Article XIV Section 3 of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah in that 
it deprives a man of his property without due 
process of law." 
The writer believes the question of due process 
has already been adequately treated and that the 
Plaintiff's contentions have been met. 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 8G. 
"That said statute violates Article XIV 
Section 4 of the ,Constitution of the State of 
Utah in that it enables a city, county, town, 
school district or other municipal corporation 
to exceed the debt limits imposed by the Con-
stitution." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
49 
The Constitutional provision involved reads as 
follows: 
"When authorized to create indebtedness 
as provided in Section 3 of this Article, no 
county shall become indebted to an amount, 
including existing indebtedness, exceeding 
two per centum. No city, town, school dis-
trict or other municipal corporation, shall 
become indebted to an amount, including 
existing indebtedness, exceeding four per 
centum of the value of the taxable property 
therein, the value to be ascertained by the 
last assessment for State and County pur-
poses, previous to the incurring of such in-
debtedness; except that in incorporated cities 
the assessment shall be taken from the last 
assessment for city purposes; provided, that 
no part of the indebtedness allowed in this 
section shall be incurred for other than 
strictly county, city, town, or school district 
purposes; provided further, that any city of 
the first and second class when authorized as 
provided in Section three of this article, may 
be allowed to incur a larger indebtedness, not 
to exceed four per centum and any city of the 
third class, or town, not to exceed eight per 
centum additional, for supplying such city or 
town with water, artificial lights or sewers, 
when the works for supplying such water, 
light and sewers, shall be owned and con-
trolled by the municipality.'' 
It is of particular importance to the Defendant 
that this issue be decided by this Court. Bonding 
companies are unwilling to purchase the bonds of 
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the district until the court has spoken on this spe-
cific issue. 
The burden of Plaintiff's argument is that the 
improvement district is a sub-division of the Coun-
ty in which it is established. It is the contention of 
the Defendant that the improvement district is not 
the sub-division of a county. In the Lehi City vs. 
M eiling case a question before the court was wheth-
er or not a Metropolitan Water District was a sub-
division of either a city, town or county. The Court 
said: 
"We are satisfied the Metropolitan Wa-
ter District is not a subdivision of either a 
city, town or county within the m¢aning of 
the word 'subdivision' as used in the Consti-
tution." 
The writer contends that the Improvement Dis-
trict, like the Metropolitan Water District, is a pub-
lic agency of government deriving its powers di-
rectly from the State by means of a general law 
enacted by the Legislature. There are analogous 
features of the two districts that should be noted 
here: 
1. Both entities are created by a general 
law enacted by the State Legislature. 
2. The indebtedness of each entity is in-
curred by action of the governing body 
of each District and the taxes imposed 
upon the district are levied and col-
lected in both instances by the county 
government. 
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3. With both districts taxes are levied 
based on the value of all the property 
within the district, rather than being 
levied based on benefits to particular 
parcels of property within the dis-
trict. 
This third observation is of significance be-
cause of the following language in the Meiling case : 
"In this state, Irrigation, Drainage and 
Mosquito abatement Districts have hereto-
fore been created by legislative enactment, 
and the validity of the Drainage and Irriga-
tion Districts has been sustained by this 
Court. There is a marked distinction between 
such Districts where assessments may be 
levied, based on benefits to the property in-
cluded, and a Metropolitan Water District 
where taxes may be levied on the basis of 
value of all of the property within the Dis-
trict." 
In other words, both the Improvement District 
and the Metropolitan Water District are alike in the 
above regard, and the Constitutionality of the Metro-
politan Water District law was upheld. 
The following language of the Court in the 
Meiling case sets forth eloquently the attitude of 
the Court with regard to the indebtedness ques-
tion as it impinges upon "districts": 
"It is true the framers of the Constitu-
tion feared debt and wisely attempted to place 
restrictions on the governmental subdivisions 
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so that they could not incur indebtedness in 
such amount as to lead to insolvency. There-
strictions were not, however, placed on the 
people directly, but on the state, counties, 
cities, towns and schools districts and other 
municipalities in and through which the peo-
ple were to be governed. There is no prohibi-
tion expressly or by implication, restraining 
the legislative power from providing other 
corporations or organizations for public pur-
pose by which the public welfare could be ad-
vanced. If the debt limitations are construed 
so strictly as to prevent the creation of any 
public corporation with the power to incur 
debt payable by taxpayers, except those spe-
cifically enumerated and to the extent per-
mitted it would seem to follow that the legis-
lative power would not extend to the creation 
of irrigation, drainage and other districts 
with limited powers. These have the power to 
incur debt and to collect money by assess-
ment on property in payment of such debt 
and for the operating expenses of the district. 
The creation of such districts has been held 
within the lawful exercise of power by the 
legislature.'' 
Later in the opinion the Court points out: 
"It is generally recognized that the debts 
of special improvement or assessment dis-
tricts are excluded from constitutional limita-
tion with respect to the cities towns, coun-
ties, school districts or the state, notwith-
standing, they may operate within the same 
terri to rial boundaries." 
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Drainage, irrigation, mosquito districts have. not 
been held by this Court to be sub-divisions of coun-
ties. From the standpoint of the relationship be-
twen the County and drainage, irrigation and im-
provement districts there are many features of 
those districts that make them analogous: 
1. They are all created under general 
statutes enacted by the legislature. 
2. 'They are all created by petition to and 
action of the Board of County Com-
missioners. 
3. The taxes authorized to be imposed 
on residents of the districts are levied 
and collected by the County govern-
ment. 
The writer contends that irrigation and drain-
age districts are just as much "creatures of the 
County Commission" as the Improvement District, 
yet the laws creating them have been upheld as con-
stitutional. 
On this subject the action of this Court in the 
case of Patterick vs. Carbon Water Conservancy 
District should again be consulted. In reference to 
this indebtedness question the conservancy district 
and the improvement district are analogous: 
1. They are created under authority of 
general statutes enacted by the legis-
lature. 
2. They may each include within their 
boundaries parts of a single county. 
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3. They are empowered through their 
governing boards to create indebted-
ness. 
4. The tax levied by both is a general tax 
and not a special assessment. 
5. Taxes for both are levied and collected 
by the County government. 
6. Their functions and purposes are sim-
ilar as has already been pointed out. 
In the Patterick case the Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the water conservancy district act 
when the court was faced with the indebtedness 
problem. In other words, the Supreme Court made 
the same decision in connection with the Conserv-
ancy District that it made with regard to the Metro-
politan Water District in the Meiling case. The 
Court in the Patterick case held that the Conserv-
ancy District was not a municipality and it was not 
a sub-division of a municipality and that it was 
not a sub-division of a county. It is interesting to 
note in this connecton that the boundaries of the 
Carbon Water Conservancy District were co-termin-
ous with the boundaries of Carbon County. The 
Court said: 
"A Water Conservancy District is an 
arm of the government, separate and distinct 
from any municipality, with powers and rules 
of its own and the mere fact that its territor-
ial boundaries may encompass the territorial 
boundaries of a municipality does not make 
it a part of the city. Its powers and objects 
are distinct and separate." 
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In the case of Wicks vs. Salt Lake City, 208 P. 
538, decided in 1922, the Court had this indebted-
ness problem before it. The Utah Session Laws of 
1921 provided for the creation of a special improve-
ment district within a city, and part of that statute 
read as follows : 
"Section 1. Any city or town which has 
issued, or may hereafter issue, any special 
improvement bonds or warrants, shall by ap-
propriation from the general fund or by the 
levy of a tax of not to exceed one mill in any 
one year, or by the issuance of general obli-
gation bonds, or by appropriation from such 
other sources as may be determined by the 
board of commissioners, or. city council, or 
board of town trustees, as the case may be, 
create a fund for the purpose of guaranteeing, 
to the extent of such fund, the payment of 
bonds or warrants and interest thereon, is-
sued against local improvement districts for 
the payment of local improvements therein." 
The contention was made by the Plaintiff in 
the case that the statute was unconstituional due to 
the fact that it enabled a city to create a debt in 
excess of that allowed by the constitution. With re-
gard to that matter the Court said: 
"Section 4 (of the Constitution) limits 
the amount of indebtedness that may be cre-
ated when authorized in the preceding sec-
tion (by vote of the people, as required in Ar-
ticle 14, Section 3 of the Constitution). 
"It must be conceded that these provis-
ions, like every other provision of the Consti-
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tution, are the paramount law of the state 
concerning the subjects to which they relate. 
Any law enacted by the Legislature in con-
flict therewith is null and void, but the con-
flict must first be made to appear. If there is 
any reasonable doubt about it, the law will 
not be declared unconstitutional. This is ele-
mentary doctrine. Plaintiff does not contend 
that it manifestly appears that the act of 1921 
attempts to auhorize the creation of an in-
debtedness in excess of the limit fixed by the 
Constitution, but the contention seems to be 
that there is a vague and remote possibility 
that a literal compliance with the law may at 
some time in the future result in the creation 
of an indebtedness in excess of the constitu- · 
tional limit. We seriously doubt if there is a 
sufficient showing on the part of Plaintiff con-
cerning this question to justify an extended 
discussion. Plaintiff no doubt has presented 
every argument that can be presented on that 
side of the question, but his argument is by 
no means convincing." 
Here then the Court allowed the city to pro-
vide for the creation of the increased indebtedness 
even though there was the possibility of thereby 
creating an indebtedness in excess of that permit-
ted by the Constitution. The Court's opinion went off 
admittedly chiefly on the argument that due to the 
large assessed valuation of the city it would be ex-
tremely unlikely that the indebtedness created by 
the improvement district would ever cause the city 
to create such a large indebtedness as to exceed the 
limitations of the constitutional provision. The same 
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argument could be advanced for the creation of the 
indebtedness by the Magna Improvement District 
involved here. The assessed valuation of the area in-
cluded within the boundaries of the Magna Improve-
ment District is so minute, compared with the as-
sessed valuation of the entire County, that it is in-
conceivable that an indebtedness amounting to 
twelve per cent of the assessed valuation of the 
property in that district would ever result in caus-
ing the county to exceed its debt limitation. 
The editors of A. L. R. in 94 A. L. R. 819 dis-
cuss this indebtedness matter and I quote from 
their conclusions: 
"The general rule is that in applying a 
constitutional or statutory debt limit provis-
ion to separate and distinct political units 
with identical boundaries, exercising differ-
ent functions, only the indebtedness of the 
political unit in question can be considered, 
and the debts of the other independent poli-
tical units should be excluded." 
On Page 824 of the ·same volume the editors 
: say: 
"In most of the cases involving the ques-
tion the same rule has been applied in the 
case of overlapping boundaries as in the case 
of identical boundaries so that in determining 
the debt limit of a political unit as prescribed 
in the constiutional or statutory provisions 
applicable thereto, the indebtedness of another 
separate and independent political unit which 
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embraces part of, or more than the territory 
of the former unit is not to be taken into con-
sideration.'' 
In the light of the authority cited above and the 
reasoning set forth in those cases the writer con-
tend~ that the Improvement District is not a muni-
cipality or sub-division thereof and is not a sub-
division of a county, but is an independent political 
unit and its debt should not be included in the debt 
of any city or county. Accordingly the law authoriz-
ing creation of the district is not in violation of 
the indebtedness provision of the Constitution. 
PLAINTIF'F'S COMPLAINT 8H. 
"That the provisions of Section 8 of said 
statute under subheading 'Proceedings on 
Bond Issue' relative to advertising bonds for 
sale only in Salt Lake City papers, is in viola-
tion of Article I, Section 24 of the Constitu-
tion of the State of Utah." 
Article I Section 24 of the Constituion of the 
State of Utah reads as folows: 
"All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation." 
The writers of the act in providing that a notice re-
questing bids for bonds be published in a newspaper 
of general circulation in Salt Lake City had in mind 
the fact that all prospective Utah purchasers of such 
bonds have their offices in Salt Lake City. The sta-
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tute is designed to provide publication in a news-
paper that would be most likely to give notice to the 
bond purchasers of the opportunity to bid on the 
purchase. 
It appears to the writer that in so doing the 
legislature did not create any improper classifica-
tion which would be violative of Section 24, Article 
I of the Constitution. 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 81. 
"That Section 12 of said statute, rela-
tive to the sale of water outside the District, 
is in violation of the spirit and intent of the 
constitutional prohibition set forth in Article 
XI, Seeton 6 of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah. Said statute also violates Article XI, 
Section of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah in that Sections 11 and 14 of said sta-
tute authorize the Board of Trustees to estab-
lish any water rate that it desires, whereas 
the Constitution provides that municipalities 
must provide water to their inhabitants at 
reasonable charges." 
Article XI Section 6 reads as follows: 
(Municipalities forbidden to sell water-
works or rights.) 
"No municipal corporation shall, direct-
ly or indirectly, lease, sell, alien or dispose 
of any waterworks, water rights, or sources 
of water supply now, or hereafter to be owned 
or controlled by it; but all such waterworks, 
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water rights and sources of water supply now 
owned or hereafter to be acquired by any 
municipal corporation shall be preserved, 
~ai~taine~ and operated by it for supplying 
Its Inhabitants with water at reasonable 
charges; provided, that nothing herein con-
tained shall be construed to prevent any such 
municipal corporation from exchanging water 
rights, or sources of water supply for other 
water rights or sources of water supply of 
equal value, and to be devoted in like manner 
to the public supply of its inhabitants." 
The answer to the allegation of the Plaintiff is 
simply that an improvement district is not a muni-
cipality. That issue has been considered earlier in 
this Brief. The Supreme Court of Utah has stated 
that metropolitan water districts and water con-
servancy districts are not municipalities. The Utah 
Court has not seen fit to declare irrigation districts 
or drainage districts municipalities. If those public 
agencies are not considered by the Court to be muni-
cipalities, then it appears to the writer there is no 
basis for adjudicating an· improvement district to 
be a municipality. 
Plantiff contends that the following provision 
of Section 7 of the Improvement District Act is un-
consti tu tiona! : 
"A trustee may be employed as general 
manager of the properties of the district at 
such additional compensation as may be fixed 
by the other two trustees and when so em-
ployed he shall continue to perform the duties 
of trustee.'' 
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Syllogestically speaking, Plaintiff's major pre-
mise is that it is a violation of the Utah Constitu-
tion for a County official to contract with the Board 
of County Commissioners or to receive any com-
pensation from the County other than that which he 
is entitled by law to receive as a county official. His 
minor premise is that in contemplation of the spirit 
of the Constitution an Improvement ·District is the 
same as a County and that a Trustee should not be 
able to contract with the Board of Trustees or re-
ceive any compensation other than that provided 
for by the law to be given to a Trustee. His con-
clusion is that the provision in the law allowing a 
Trustee to receive compensation other than that he 
is authorized to receive for the performance of his 
duties as a Trustee is unconstituional. 
The writer contends that according to authority 
cited by the Plaintiff himself his major premise is 
fallacious, and therefore his conclusion is incorrect. 
Plaintiff cites 15 C. J., Paragraph 162 at Pages 497 
and 498. That paragraph reads as follows: 
''Where the salary or compensation of a 
County official is definitely fixed by law, it is 
generally held that such sum is intended to 
include his entire official remuneration and to 
preclude extra charges for any services what-
soever, unless it is clear that the statute con-
templated and intended additional compensa-
tion for certain extra services . ... Compensa-
tion may be recovered by a county official for 
the performance of services entirely outside 
the scope of the duties of the office where the 
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services were performed under a lawful con-
tract with the County Commissioners." 
From the language of the statute quoted by the 
Plaintiff in his Brief it makes it clear that the sta-
tute "contemplated and intended additional compen-
sation for certain extra services." It is also clear 
from the statute that the services to be performed 
by the "general manager of the properties of the 
district" are to be "services entirely outside the 
scope of the office" of trustee. Consequently, inas-
much as Plaintiff's major premise is fallacious his 
conclusion fails. 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 8J. 
"That Article I, Sections 1, 2 and 27 of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah remind 
the citizens of Utah that every citizen has cer-
tain inherent and inalienable rights; that all 
political power is in the people and that fre-
quent recurrence to these fundamental prin-
ciples is essential to the security of individual 
rights and the perpetuity of free government; 
that Chapter 24, Laws of Utah, 1949, is in 
violation of these provisions of the Consti-
tution." 
It is the contention of the writer that there is 
nothing about the Improvement District Act which 
is inconsistent with fundamental principles of con-
stitutional government or which would militate 
against the security of individual rights and the 
perpetuity of free government. 
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The writer believes that the contentions of the 
Plaintiff have been answered and that this Court 
should uphold the constitutionality of the Improve-
ment District Act. · 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARVIN J. BERTOCH 
OF ROMNEY, BOYER & BERTOCH 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1409 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
Attorney General of 
The State of Utah 
Attorney for Third 
Party Defendant 
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